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One of the hallmarks of human cognition is cognitive flexibility, the ability to adapt thoughts
and behaviors according to changing task demands. Previous research has suggested
that the number of different exemplars that must be processed within a task (the set
size) can influence an individual’s ability to switch flexibly between different tasks. This
paper provides evidence that when tasks have a small set size, children’s cognitive
flexibility is impaired compared to when tasks have a large set size. This paper also
offers insights into the mechanism by which this effect comes about. Understanding
how set size interacts with task-switching informs the debate regarding the relative
contributions of bottom-up priming and top-down control processes in the development
of cognitive flexibility. We tested two accounts for the relationship between set size and
cognitive flexibility: the (bottom-up) Stimulus-Task Priming account and the (top-down)
Rule Representation account. Our findings offered support for the Stimulus-Task Priming
account, but not for the Rule Representation account. They suggest that children are
susceptible to bottom-up priming caused by stimulus repetition, and that this priming can
impair their ability to switch between tasks. These findings make important theoretical
and practical contributions to the executive function literature: theoretically, they show that
the basic features of a task exert a significant influence on children’s ability to flexibly shift
between tasks through bottom-up priming effects. Practically, they suggest that children’s
cognitive flexibility may have been underestimated relative to adults’, as paradigms used
with children typically have a smaller set size than those used with adults. These findings
also have applications in education, where they have the potential to inform teaching in
key areas where cognitive flexibility is required, such as mathematics and literacy.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the hallmarks of human cognition is its flexibility. People
are capable of flexibly adapting their thoughts and behaviors
according to novel or changing environmental demands or task
goals. For example, when switching between a Mac and a PC, dif-
ferent responses are often required to achieve the same goal, such
as pressing a button in the top-left or top-right corner to close
a browser window. Cognitive flexibility in adults and children is
affected by the set size of the tasks involved—that is, the size of the
pool of different stimuli that must be processed in the task (Kray
and Eppinger, 2006; Kray et al., 2012). When a large pool of stim-
uli are used (a large set size), performance is better than when a
small pool of stimuli are used (a small set size).
Set size is of theoretical importance because it informs the
debate regarding the roles of top-down cognitive control and
bottom-up priming in the development of cognitive flexibility
(Cepeda et al., 2001). Set size is also methodologically important
because one of the crucial differences between cognitive flexi-
bility paradigms used with adults and those used with children
is their set size (Cragg and Chevalier, 2012). Cognitive flexibil-
ity paradigms used with young children typically use a small
number of stimuli (e.g., the Dimensional Change Card Sort,
DCCS, Zelazo, 2006; and Shape School, Espy, 1997). In con-
trast, paradigms used with adults typically use a much larger
set size (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Richter and Yeung, 2012).
Understanding the influence of set size in cognitive flexibility
development can also better inform early school education for
children in key areas such as mathematics and literacy where
cognitive flexibility plays a central role (Bull and Scerif, 2001;
St Clair-Thompson and Gathercole, 2006; Blair and Razza, 2007;
Bull et al., 2008; Yeniad et al., 2013). This paper explores what role
set size plays in cognitive flexibility during the early school years.
We will first describe the development of cognitive flexibility dur-
ing the early school years, and then discuss possible explanations
for the role that set size might play in children’s ability to switch
flexibly between tasks.
When studying children’s cognitive flexibility, researchers typ-
ically use paradigms that involve switching between two simple
tasks, such as matching stimuli by their color and matching stim-
uli by their shape (Zelazo, 2006). By 3 years, children can perform
either task well on its own, but typically fail to switch from one
to the other (Zelazo et al., 1996). By 4 years, children can reli-
ably make a single switch from one task to another (Zelazo et al.,
1996) but experience difficulty switching flexibly back and forth
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between the two tasks (Carlson, 2005; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005;
Moriguchi and Hiraki, 2013). Around the age of five, children
become able to flexibly switch back and forth between simple
tasks (Chevalier and Blaye, 2009). At this age, response time starts
to be a reliable metric of children’s cognitive flexibility. This allows
nuanced questions about the component processes required for
cognitive flexibility to be investigated (Best and Miller, 2010).
From around this age children are more likely to respond more
slowly and less accurately when asked to switch from one task
to another (i.e., on switch trials) than when asked to repeat the
same task (i.e., on non-switch trials) (Dauvier et al., 2012). This
is known as the switch cost. Switch costs tend to decrease with
age (Crone et al., 2006; Huizinga et al., 2006; Chevalier and Blaye,
2009; Cragg and Nation, 2009; however this developmental trend
is not reliable after the preschool years: see Dibbets and Jolles,
2006; Karbach and Kray, 2007; Kray et al., 2012). Switch costs do
not diminish completely. They can reliably be found when adults
must switch between tasks (for a review see Kiesel et al., 2010).
Examining switch costs in young children allows us to address
important questions, such as what processes contribute to switch
costs, and how these processes change during development (Best
and Miller, 2010). Lessons drawn from adult participants suggest
that switch costs reflect two distinct types of cognitive pro-
cess. First, top-down control processes contribute to switch costs.
These include the retrieval of task rules and the deliberate shifting
of attention toward task-relevant stimulus attributes which are
required on switch trials, but not on non-switch trials (Rogers and
Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 2003). Second, bottom-
up priming processes contribute to switch costs. These include
the priming of associations between stimuli and responses that
build up over successive trials and facilitate non-switch trials but
are detrimental to switch trials (Allport and Wylie, 2000; Waszak
et al., 2003). It is not yet well understood to what extent each of
these processes contributes to switch costs in children (see Cragg
and Chevalier, 2012 for a review).
In this paper we explore the role of set size in the devel-
opment of cognitive flexibility in children aged between 4 and
12 years. In particular, through manipulations of set size, we
investigate the relative roles of top-down rule representation and
bottom-up stimulus-task priming on cognitive flexibility during
the early school years. The following sections explain how rule
representation and stimulus-task priming relate to set size and the
development of cognitive flexibility.
One mechanism by which set size would likely affect cogni-
tive flexibility is through the way that task rules are represented.
Consider a paradigm where childrenmust switch betweenmatch-
ing stimuli by their colors and matching them by their shapes.
With a small set size [when the only colors in the task are (blue)
and (red)], task rules can be efficiently represented in stimulus-
specific terms—for example, “red blocks go in the red box” and
“blue blocks go in the blue box.” However, with a large set size,
(for example, when there are many colors), it would be highly
inefficient to formulate one rule for each individual color. It
would be far more efficient to represent the task rules in abstract,
dimension-level terms, such as “put the blocks into boxes that are
the same color.” Indeed, large pools of stimuli have been found to
promote abstract categorization in toddlers (Perry et al., 2010). It
is thus plausible that large and small set sizes create quite different
task representations: a large set size on a task is likely to engen-
der more abstract, dimension-level representations of task rules,
whereas a small set size may engender more stimulus-specific
representations of task rules.
Relevant to the relationship between set size and cognitive
flexibility, evidence suggests that the way rules are represented
determines how flexibly they can be switched between. It has
been suggested that the early development of the prefrontal cor-
tex supports abstract representation of task rules (Munakata et al.,
2011) and cognitive flexibility (Moriguchi and Hiraki, 2013).
Changes in the way that task rules are represented, from stimulus-
specific representation to dimension-level representation, leads
to better cognitive flexibility performance (Kharitonova et al.,
2009; Kharitonova and Munakata, 2011). Thus, it is plausible
that a large set size facilitates cognitive flexibility, by engender-
ing dimension-level representation of task rules, and that smaller
set sizes hinder rule switching, by engendering stimulus-specific
rule representation.
The second mechanism by which set size would likely affect
cognitive flexibility is through stimulus-task priming. Stimulus-
task priming refers to the bottom-up process by which prior
experience on a task leads to pairings that have been previously
experienced being preferentially activated on later trials, regard-
less of whether they are currently task-relevant or not (Reuss et al.,
2011). When the set size is small, individual stimuli appear more
frequently—so there is more stimulus repetition—than when the
set size is large. Associations between specific stimuli and spe-
cific tasks are thus more likely to build up with small set sizes
than with large set sizes. Stimulus repetition has been shown
to cause stimulus-task priming in adults, which contributes to
greater switch costs (Waszak et al., 2003; Koch and Allport, 2006).
Stimulus repetition is also detrimental to cognitive flexibility in
preschool children (Müller et al., 2006; Experiment 3).
There are two reasons for thinking that stimulus-task priming
might inflate switch costs. Firstly, on non-switch trials where the
task repeats, if the stimulus was already associated with that task,
then responses should be faster and more accurate because the
currently relevant task was primed by the stimulus. Secondly, on
switch trials, if the stimulus was associated with the previous (but
no longer relevant) task, then responses should be slower and less
accurate because the incorrect task was primed by the stimulus
(Waszak and Hommel, 2007). Indeed, in a voluntary switching
paradigm, where participants could choose to respond with a task
repetition or a task switch on each trial, stimulus repetition was
found to bias a task repetition response and stimulus change was
found to bias a task switch response (Mayr and Bell, 2006).
To our knowledge only two studies have directly explored the
effects of set size on cognitive flexibility in a developmental con-
text (Kray and Eppinger, 2006; Kray et al., 2012). The first of these
studies compared cognitive flexibility in young (M = 21 years)
and older adults (M = 66 years) on a large and a small set size
(Kray and Eppinger, 2006). It was found that the small set size
induced greater switch costs than the large set size, but this effect
was only seen in the older adults.
The second study (Kray et al., 2012) assessed cognitive flex-
ibility in two groups of children (4- to 6-year-olds and 7- to
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10-year-olds) and one group of young adults. Set size affected
cognitive flexibility in two ways. First, when the set size was large,
older children were better able to ignore task-irrelevant informa-
tion than when set size was small. This effect was not seen for
younger children or adults. Second, there was an effect of set
size on conflict adaptation in older children. In some trials, both
tasks would lead to the same response (compatible trials) so there
was no conflict. In other trials, the relevant task would lead to
one response and the non-relevant task would lead to the other
response (incompatible trials) so there was conflict between the
two tasks. The older children made greater control adjustments
following incompatible trials in the small set size condition than
the large set size condition. This suggests that the conflict that
occurs between tasks is more salient with small set sizes than with
large set sizes, and consequently results in better adjustment of
control processes following its occurrence.
The absence of set size effects in younger children was sur-
prising given the known developmental trends described above
in both abstract rule representation (Munakata et al., 2012) and
stimulus-task priming (Hommel et al., 2011). Furthermore, there
is indirect evidence to suggest that preschool children’s cogni-
tive flexibility may be enhanced by increasing the task set size.
For example, preschool children’s ability to switch tasks has been
improved by increasing the set size on the DCCS from two col-
ors and two shapes to four colors and four shapes (Fisher, 2011a).
However, the number of response options was also increased from
two to four in that experiment, so it is unclear which of the
two methodological changes was responsible for the facilitative
effect. The absence of a set size effect in the youngest children in
Kray et al.’s (2012) study may have been due to what the authors
describe as the high “general demands on cognitive control pro-
cessing” that the experimental paradigm entailed (Kray et al.,
2012, p. 127). These high demands and the length of the test
period may have also resulted in a high exclusion rate for the
youngest age group (35%). Clearly, set size influences cognitive
flexibility. However, the somewhat ambiguous findings indicate
that further investigation is necessary.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was that increasing the set
size did not reduce children’s switching costs. This stands counter
to the predictions drawn from the broader literature, and indeed
counter to Kray et al.’s (2012) own predictions. However, this sur-
prising absence of set size effect may in part have been due to
the paradigm used. In one task, children categorized pictures as
“animals” or “objects.” This differs from typical developmental
cognitive flexibility paradigms, which tend to be based on percep-
tual rather than conceptual features of the stimuli (FIST, Jacques
and Zelazo, 2001; DCCS, Zelazo, 2006). Children are typically
required to judge the color or shape of a stimulus, rather than its
conceptual category membership. Conceptual categorization is a
perfectly legitimate construct to study, though its use in cognitive
flexibility paradigms may have attenuated the effects of set size in
Kray et al.’s (2012) study for two reasons. First, children’s percep-
tual processing is more robust than their conceptual processing
(Fisher, 2011b), which would likely lead to stronger stimulus-task
priming for perceptual than conceptual features. Second, there is
also evidence to suggest that priming can occur at the level of
semantic category as well as for individual stimuli (Waszak et al.,
2004). Semantic category-level priming may have attenuated the
facilitative effects of a large set size on switching costs.
The two experiments in this paper use the Switching Inhibition
and Flexibility Task (SwIFT, Carroll and Cragg, 2012). This is a
developmentally appropriate measure of cognitive flexibility that
requires children tomatch stimuli according to their color or their
shape. This kind of perceptual processing is known to be robust
in young children (Zelazo et al., 1996; Fisher, 2011b). Processing
demands that are orthogonal to cognitive flexibility are mini-
mized: the goal setting demands are minimal because the task
is cued on every trial with a transparent auditory cue (the word
“color” or “shape”—Chevalier and Blaye, 2009). The working
memory demands are low because the responses are intuitive so
there is no need to maintain the appropriate responses for each
task. The SwIFT thus gives a relatively pure measure of the costs
of switching from one task to another by eliminating orthogo-
nal processing costs that are present in other cognitive flexibility
paradigms.
A review of the cognitive flexibility literature in general would
lead us to predict a clear set-size effect on switch costs, although
the few direct tests are tantalizingly inconclusive. On the basis of
previous findings we would predict that a large set size would lead
to smaller switch costs, and that a small set size would lead to
larger switch costs. We expected that this effect would be largest
in the youngest children, and would diminish with age. There
were two reasons for this prediction: first, young children are less
likely to spontaneously represent task rules in abstract, dimen-
sion level terms than older children (Kharitonova et al., 2009) and
so would benefit most from a manipulation that engendered this
type of rule representation. Second, children are more suscepti-
ble to stimulus-task priming than adults (Hommel et al., 2011),
and if this relationship is linear, then younger children would be
expected to be more affected by stimulus repetition than older
children. We also expect to see a reduction in switch costs more
generally during the early school years in line with findings from
the Advanced DCCS paradigm (Chevalier and Blaye, 2009).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
One hundred and forty nine 4- to 11-year-old children (80
female) were randomly selected from a larger sample attend-
ing Summer Scientist Week, a science engagement event at the
University of Nottingham. Children were randomly allocated to
one of two conditions: large set size or small set size. Each con-
dition was further subdivided by age to give three similarly sized
groups: 49 in the youngest age group (4;0- to 6;6-year-olds, M =
5;2, SD = 0;8, 27 females); 50 in the middle age group (6;7- to
8;4-year-olds, M = 7;4, SD = 0;6, 24 females); and 50 in the old-
est age group (8;5- to 11;9-year-olds, M = 9;10, SD = 1;0, 29
females). Six further children were excluded because of missing
data. Participants had no reported developmental disorders or
special educational needs. Children’s standardized scores on the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) did not differ between
the two test conditions [small set size: M = 109.29, large set size:
M = 109.73, t(138) = −0.18, p = 0.86]. This was indicative of
similar levels of general cognitive functioning in the two groups.
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BPVS scores were missing from nine participants. All the chil-
dren were tested individually in a quiet room. Parental consent
for participation in this research was obtained for all partici-
pants. The experimental procedure was approved by the School
of Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Nottingham.
Materials
Stimuli were presented and responses recorded on an Iiyama
ProLite touch screen monitor connected to a Samsung P510
PC laptop running PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007). Children
responded by touching the relevant part of the screen and the
program recorded their responses. The stimuli used in this task
were nine simple novel shape outlines filled in with solid colors.
The nine colors were all of equal saturation and brightness, and
their hues were evenly distributed on a color wheel. Each image
was approximately 6× 8 cm.
Procedure
Children played a simple matching game. They were shown a
prompt stimulus on a touchscreen computer, followed by two
response stimuli. The prompt stimulus always had two dimen-
sions (color and shape). On each trial, one response stimulus
matched the prompt’s color, and the other response stimulus
matched the prompt’s shape. Children were told to select the
response stimulus that matched the prompt on the dimension
relevant to the task for that trial (always either color or shape).
Trials were presented in two phases: the rule-learning phase
and the task-switching phase. In the rule-learning phase there
were two pure blocks of trials (6 trials each), in which children
performed the same task for every trial. In one pure block chil-
dren were required to match the stimuli by color, and in the other
pure block they were required to match the stimuli by shape. The
order of the pure blocks was counterbalanced between partici-
pants. In the task-switching phase there were three mixed blocks.
During the mixed blocks (12 trials each) children were required
to switch between the two tasks. The order of trials was pseudo-
randomized such that some trials required children to perform
the same task as the trial before (non-switch trials) and others
required children to perform a different task to the trial before
(switch trials). The first trial of each block was neither a non-
switch nor a switch trial. There were a total of 16 non-switch
trials and 17 switch trials. The number of trials was chosen to
be developmentally appropriate for the younger participants, and
was in line with previous research with 4- to 6-year-old children
on the Shape School and Advanced DCCS paradigms (Zelazo,
2006; Chevalier et al., 2010; Blaye and Chevalier, 2011).
Before each pure block, children were shown an example trial
using the standard task array of a prompt and two response stim-
uli. The task rules and the correct way to respond (touching
the appropriate response stimulus with the index finger) were
explained by the experimenter. The first pure block was also pre-
ceded by two practice trials. Feedback for correct and incorrect
performance was given after each practice trial in the form of
on-screen text and verbal feedback from the experimenter. For
all experimental trials no feedback was given. If any practice tri-
als were completed incorrectly two further practice trials were
presented.
A graphical representation of the trial procedure can be found
in Figure 1. Each trial began with a white screen showing a
black outline of a rectangle (the prompt box) located at the
top center of the screen. After a delay of 1000ms, the prompt
stimulus appeared in the prompt box, together with an auditory
cue (a female voice saying “color” or “shape,” as appropriate for
that trial). After a further delay of 500ms, two response stimuli
appeared in the bottom left and right corners of the screen. One
response stimulus matched the prompt on the color dimension,
and the other response stimulus matched the prompt on the
shape dimension. Neither response stimulus ever matched the
prompt stimulus on both dimensions. All stimuli remained on
the screen until children responded. Testing lasted approximately
15min.
The experiment used a between-participants design, and
there were two conditions, differing only in terms of set size.
In the small set size condition there were two exemplars of
color and two exemplars of shape (meaning that there were
four stimuli in total). As in the Advanced DCCS, the tar-
get stimuli were kept constant, although their positions were
counterbalanced. Within each block, each prompt stimulus was
displayed six times, an equal number of times on color and
shape trials, and approximately an equal number of times
on non-switch and switch trials. There was an average of
one intervening trial between recurrences of the same prompt
stimulus.
In the large set size condition there were nine exemplars of
color and nine exemplars of shape (meaning that there were
81 bidimensional stimuli in total). Stimulus selection was con-
strained so that a prompt stimulus never appeared more than
once within a block, and the color and shape values never
repeated on consecutive trials. On approximately half of the tri-
als, one of the dimension values (the color or the shape) had
occurred previously within the block. There were on average
FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure. The prompt stimulus (top) matches one
response stimulus (bottom left) according to its color and the other
response stimulus (bottom right) according to its shape. An auditory cue
(“color” or “shape”) is onset concurrently with the prompt stimulus.
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four intervening trials between recurrences of a dimension value
within each block.
RESULTS
All analyses were performed after excluding the first trial from
each block, since these trials were neither switch nor non-switch
trials. Trials with RTs less than 200ms or greater than 10,000ms,
and trials that were 2.5 standard deviations away from the indi-
vidual’s mean RT for that type of trial (5.4%), were excluded
from the response time analysis. The response time analysis
also included only correct trials that also followed a correct
trial. This is because only these trials can be definitively classi-
fied as a non-switch trial or a switch trial. The mean number
of trials entered into the analysis did not differ between the
set size conditions, nor between switch and non-switch trials.
Younger children contributed fewer trials to the analysis than
older children because of higher error rates (Ms = 23.4, 25.4,
and 27.4 trials entered for the youngest, middle and oldest
age groups respectively). A natural logarithmic transformation
was applied to the response time data to control for baseline
changes in response time with age (Meiran, 1996; Chevalier et al.,
2010). For clarity, untransformed RTs are presented in figures
and tables.
Analyses were conducted separately for each of two depen-
dent variables: mean accuracy and mean log-transformed RTs.
To assess switch costs, mixed-measures ANOVAs were performed
with trial type (non-switch vs. switch) as a within-participants
variable, and age group (youngest vs. middle vs. oldest) and set
size (small vs. large) as between-participants variables. We chose
to use trial type (non-switch and switch) as a within-subjects vari-
able rather than the difference score because this controls for both
overall performance and processing speed differences between the
experimental groups.
The analysis of accuracy data revealed a main effect of
age, F(2, 143) = 10.24, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.13. Bonferroni-adjusted
post-hoc tests revealed that the youngest group was less accurate
than both the middle and oldest age groups (ps< 0.05). The mid-
dle age group was also less accurate than the oldest age group
(p < 0.05). Analysis of trial type revealed a significant switch cost,
F(1, 143) = 50.47, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26, with less accurate perfor-
mance on switch trials than non-switch trials (see Table 1 for a
summary of the means). Accuracy switch costs were not signifi-
cantly different between age groups. There was no effect of set size
on the accuracy of performance. This indicates that there were no
baseline differences in overall accuracy on the tasks between the
set size conditions.
The analysis of RT data revealed amain effect of age, F(2, 143) =
24.36, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.25. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests
revealed that the youngest group was slower than both the mid-
dle and oldest age groups (ps < 0.01). The middle age group
was also slower than the oldest age group (p < 0.01). Analysis
of trial type revealed a significant switch cost, F(1, 143) = 22.57,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.14, with slower performance on switch trials
than on non-switch trials. RT switch costs were not significantly
different between age groups (see Table 1 for a summary of the
means).
There was an interaction between set size and trial type,
F(1, 143) = 5.84, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.04, such that switch costs were
greater in the small set size condition than in the large set size
condition (see Figure 2). To investigate whether set size affected
response times on switch trials, on non-switch trials, or on both,
separate Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests were performed for
RTs on Switch trials and non-switch trials, comparing the small
and large set-size conditions. Descriptively, non-switch trials were
faster in the small set size condition than the large set size
condition (see Figure 2). Conversely, switch trials were slower
in the small set size condition than the large set size condi-
tion. However, these differences were not significant (ps > 0.1).
There was no overall effect of set size on RT, which indicates
that the set size conditions did not differ in terms of processing
speed.
Paired samples t-tests were conducted to determine whether
RTs on switch and non-switch trials were significantly different
for each set size condition (i.e., whether there was a significant
switch cost). In the small set size condition, switch trials were
significantly slower than non-switch trials, t(69) = 4.57, p < 0.01.
Table 1 | Mean accuracy rates and response times by trial type in Experiment 1.
Set size N Age in
years
Female Accuracy (%) Response times (ms)
Pure
blocks
Non-switch Switch Switch
cost
Pure
blocks
Non-switch Switch Switch
cost
YOUNGEST CHILDREN
Small 25 5;2 (0;8) 18 96.3 (5.9) 89.5 (13.2) 78.4 (16.9) 11.1 (12.3) 1482 (440) 1578 (365) 1916 (715) 337 (584)
Large 24 5;3 (0;9) 9 96.9 (4.1) 89.6 (11.0) 84.1 (12.8) 5.5 (12.1) 1362 (287) 1714 (382) 1773 (390) 59 (203)
MIDDLE CHILDREN
Small 23 7;4 (0;7) 11 96.0 (5.5) 93.5 (7.9) 85.2 (7.1) 8.3 (10.2) 1104 (300) 1391 (391) 1493 (490) 102 (183)
Large 27 7;5 (0;6) 13 96.3 (4.8) 93.1 (8.6) 86.3 (12.2) 6.8 (10.6) 1186 (293) 1484 (364) 1571 (434) 87 (235)
OLDEST CHILDREN
Small 22 9;9 (1;1) 12 97.0 (6.1) 94.6 (5.9) 91.2 (13.1) 3.4 (14.5) 914 (192) 1168 (318) 1258 (450) 91 (219)
Large 28 9;8 (1;0) 17 96.4 (5.8) 96.4 (5.2) 92.0 (7.2) 4.4 (8.2) 999 (293) 1239 (257) 1272 (310) 33 (180)
For ease of reference, switch costs are also shown. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean RT in the switch and non-switch trials as a function
of the set size. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
In the large set size condition, switch trials were marginally slower
than non-switch trials, t(78) = 1.91, p = 0.060.
To investigate whether there were more gradual age-related
changes in cognitive flexibility in our sample, accuracy and RT
switch costs (difference scores between switch and non-switch
trials) were entered into a bivariate correlation analysis with
age (mean-centered). Both types of switch cost were negatively
correlated with age [accuracy: r(147) = − 0.18, p = 0.033; RT:
r(147) = − 0.17, p = 0.037].
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, a switching paradigm with minimal incidental
demands was used to investigate the effects of set size on cognitive
flexibility during the early school years. The results showed signif-
icant age-related changes in accuracy and RT on both non-switch
and switch trials. However, contrary to our predictions there were
no significant differences in switch costs between the age groups.
This is consistent with other studies that have found little or no
change in switch costs over the early school period (Dibbets and
Jolles, 2006; Karbach and Kray, 2007; Kray et al., 2012; though
see also Chevalier and Blaye, 2009; Cragg and Nation, 2009).
However, correlational analyses did reveal a developmental trend
of reduced switch costs with age for both the accuracy and the RT
data. This suggests that there are developmental changes to switch
costs, but that these are gradual andmay be harder to detect when
data are categorized for analysis by age group. This gradual trend
may explain the inconsistency in the literature with regards to
age-related changes in switch costs.
In line with our predictions, when the set size was small,
response-time switch costs were greater than when the set size was
large. This indicates that a smaller set size leads to more inter-
ference between tasks, and is consistent with Kray et al.’s (2012)
findings. It is also consistent with findings that show switch costs
to be greater when there is more stimulus overlap between tasks
(Waszak et al., 2003; Koch and Allport, 2006). These data clearly
demonstrate, then, that a set size effect is apparent in children’s
cognitive flexibility. Furthermore, the difference between switch
and non-switch trials was only marginally significant when the
set size was large. This shows that the cognitive processes that
contribute to switch costs are affected by the set size. Thus, to
understand the processes that contribute to switch costs in chil-
dren, it is necessary to understand what drives the set-size effect
found in Experiment 1. The mechanisms that underpin this effect
remain to be elucidated.
Experiment 1 identified that increasing the set size of the
tasks reduced the cost of switching between them. We have iden-
tified two candidate cognitive mechanisms that could explain
why increasing the set size reduces switch costs. The first expla-
nation, which we refer to as the Rule Representation account,
posits a mechanism in which set size affects the way that
task rules are represented, which influences cognitive flexibil-
ity (Kharitonova et al., 2009). The larger set size may engen-
der abstract, dimension-level representations of the task rules,
whereas the smaller set size may engender stimulus-specific repre-
sentations of the task rules. More abstract representations should
lead to more flexible switching between tasks (Kharitonova et al.,
2009).
The second explanation, which we refer to as the Stimulus-
Task Priming account, posits amechanism in which set size affects
bottom-up priming of stimulus-to-task mappings (Waszak et al.,
2003; Koch and Allport, 2006). This is because when the set size
is small, individual stimuli repeat more often, both within and
between the two tasks. This would be expected to lead to asso-
ciations between stimuli and tasks which would both facilitate
repeating a task from one trial to the next, and impair switching
between tasks. In contrast, when the set size is large, individual
stimuli repeat less often. This would be expected to lead to much
less pronounced priming effects relative to a smaller set size. The
direction of the means in Experiment 1 are consistent with this
account insofar as non-switch trials were slower when the set size
was large than when it was small, and switch trials were faster
when the set size was large than when it was small. In adults,
associations between stimuli and tasks can lead to switch costs
even after 100 intervening trials (Waszak et al., 2003). The dura-
tion of stimulus-task associations in children is not yet known.
The effect may last as long as it does in adults, or it may be lim-
ited to consecutive trials. To maximize the chances of detecting a
stimulus-task priming effect—if it exists—the set size conditions
differed both in terms of frequency of stimulus repetitions, and in
terms of the number of intervening trials between repetitions. The
small set size condition had many trials where stimuli repeated
from one trial to the next. The large set size condition had no tri-
als where stimuli repeated on consecutive trials. However, within
each condition, the number of intervening trials was not system-
atically varied, so the duration of stimulus-task priming was not
investigated here.
To test the Rule Representation account and the Stimulus-
Task Priming account directly, it is necessary to tease apart two
things: the rule representation effects that are initiated during the
rule-learning phase, and the priming effects that occur during
the task-switching phase. To do this, set size was varied indepen-
dently in the rule-learning phase and in the task-switching phase.
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Set size was either large or small. This two-by-two design yielded
four conditions, differing firstly according to the set size in the
rule-learning phase, and secondly according to the set size in the
later task-switching phase. Note that the Rule Representation and
Stimulus-Task Priming accounts are not mutually exclusive. The
set size effect observed in Experiment 1 may be best explained by
one process, or by the other, or by both together. Experiment 2
seeks to address this question.
The Rule Representation account predicts that the set size in
the rule-learning phase would have an effect on switch costs.
Specifically, if the set size was large in the rule-learning phase, then
children would be more likely to form more flexible dimension-
level rule representations, and if the set size was small in the
rule learning phase then children would be more likely to form
less flexible stimulus-specific rule representations. Thus, a large
set size during the rule-learning phase should lead to smaller
switch costs than a small set size during the rule-learning phase.
The Stimulus-Task Priming account predicts that the set size in
the task-switching phase would have an effect on switch costs.
Specifically, when the set size was small in the task-switching
phase, then there would be more stimulus repetition between
tasks than when the set size was large in the task-switching phase.
This would lead to larger stimulus-task priming effects when the
set size was small in the task-switching phase than when the set
size was large in the task-switching phase. Thus, a large set size
during the task-switching phase should lead to smaller switch
costs than a small set size during the task-switching phase. Note
that children form representations of the task rules quickly. Even
at 3 years of age, children are capable of forming abstract repre-
sentations of task rules after as few as six trials (Kharitonova et al.,
2009).
Experiment 2 also explores developmental changes in the
roles of rule representation and stimulus-task priming on cog-
nitive flexibility with development. With age, children become
more likely to spontaneously use abstract rule representations
(Kharitonova et al., 2009; Kharitonova and Munakata, 2011). It
was thus expected that having a large set size in the rule-learning
phase would have the greatest facilitative effect on the youngest
children in the sample, since they would be the least likely to spon-
taneously form abstract rule representations for the small set size
condition, and thus the most likely to benefit from a condition
that engenders it. Similarly, stimulus-task associations have been
shown to be more robust in children than in adults (Hommel
et al., 2011). If the strength of these associations follows a linear
relationship through development, the effects of set size during
the task-switching phase should also be strongest for the youngest
children in our sample.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
Participants
Two hundred and forty three 5- to 10-year-old children (128
female) from two suburban primary schools in the UK took part:
84 in the youngest age group (5;3- to 6; 6-year-olds, M = 6;0,
SD = 0; 4, 46 females), 79 in the middle age group (7;2- to 8;6-
year-olds,M = 8;0, SD = 0;4, 39 females) and 80 in the oldest age
group (9;5- to 10;6-year-olds, M = 10;0, SD = 0;4, 42 females).
Six further children were excluded either because they failed to
follow instructions (N = 3) or because of missing data (N = 3).
Participants had no known developmental disorders or special
educational needs. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the four conditions. All the children were tested individually in a
quiet room in their schools. Parental consent for participation in
this research was obtained for all participants. The experimental
procedure was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics
Committee at the University of Sheffield.
Materials and procedure
The stimuli and materials for Experiment 2 were the same as for
Experiment 1, except that a Dell T7570 laptop running E-Prime
v1.2 (Psychological Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) software was
connected to an ATM-152ROHACB2D touch screen monitor. Set
size was varied using a 2× 2 design with two levels of set size
(small and large) varying across the two phases of the experi-
ment (the initial rule-learning phase, and the subsequent task-
switching phase). This resulted in four conditions: the small:small
condition had a small set size in the rule-learning phase and a
small set size in the task-switching phase; the small:large condi-
tion had a small set size in the rule-learning phase and a large set
size in the task-switching phase; the large:small condition had a
large set size in the rule-learning phase and a small set size in the
task-switching phase; and the large:large condition had a large set
size in the rule-learning phase and a large set size in the task-
switching phase. (Note that the small:small condition and the
large:large condition were identical to the small and large set size
conditions in Experiment 1.) Stimulus selection was constrained
in the same way as in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
The mean accuracy and mean log-transformed response time
(RT) were calculated for each child for each trial type. Trials with
RT less than 200ms or greater than 10,000ms, and trials 2.5 stan-
dard deviations or greater away from the individual’s mean RT
for that type of trial (5.0%) were excluded from the response-
time analysis. Response-time analyses included only correct trials
that followed a correct trial. The mean number of trials entered
into the analysis did not differ between the set size conditions,
nor between switch and non-switch trials. Younger children con-
tributed fewer trials to the analysis than older children because of
higher error rates (Ms= 23.1, 25.5, and 24.3 trials entered for the
youngest, middle and oldest age groups respectively).
All analyses were performed separately for each dependent
variable of interest: mean accuracy and mean log-transformed
RTs. To assess switch costs, a mixed measures ANOVA was
performed with trial type (non-switch vs. switch) as a within-
participants factor, and age (youngest vs. middle vs. oldest), set
size in the rule-learning phase (small vs. large) and set size in
the task-switching phase (small vs. large) as between-participant
factors.
The analysis of accuracy data revealed a main effect of age,
F(2, 231) = 15.72, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.0.12. Bonferroni-adjusted
post-hoc tests showed that the youngest children were less accu-
rate than both the middle children and the oldest children (ps <
0.001; see Table 2 for a summary of the means). There was no
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 101 | 7
FitzGibbon et al. Primed to be inflexible
Table 2 | Mean accuracy rates and response times by trial type in Experiment 2.
Set size N Age in
months
Female Accuracy (%) Response times (ms)
Pure
blocks
Non-switch Switch Switch
cost
Pure
blocks
Non-switch Switch Switch
cost
YOUNGEST CHILDREN
Small:Small 21 6;1 (0;4) 11 96.8 (5.6) 89.0 (14.9) 86.6 (17.7) 2.4 (12.3) 1339 (316) 1697 (427) 1785 (428) 88 (235)
Small:Large 19 6;1 (0;4) 12 93.8 (8.5) 89.8 (17.5) 84.2 (12.6) 5.6 (10.4) 1321 (389) 1679 (339) 1772 (458) 93 (306)
Large:Small 23 5;11 (0;4) 13 98.6 (4.1) 92.9 (7.6) 82.6 (14.6) 10.3 (11.1) 1540 (340) 1757 (424) 1871 (518) 115 (304)
Large:Large 21 6;0 (0;4) 10 95.2 (6.8) 96.4 (7.0) 88.5 (12.7) 7.9 (10.8) 1410 (387) 1761 (503) 1700 (387) −62 (230)
MIDDLE CHILDREN
Small:Small 20 7;11 (0;3) 9 98.3 (3.4) 98.4 (2.8) 93.8 (6.7) 4.6 (6.2) 1167 (385) 1312 (301) 1389 (345) 77 (215)
Small:Large 20 7;11 (0;4) 9 98.3 (4.4) 98.1 (4.1) 91.5 (9.0) 6.7 (8.4) 1170 (280) 1427 (425) 1529 (376) 102 (248)
Large:Small 20 7;11 (0;4) 11 97.9 (4.6) 96.3 (5.1) 93.2 (5.8) 3.0 (7.4) 1404 (556) 1355 (367) 1499 (342) 144 (173)
Large:Large 19 8;0 (0;4) 10 96.7 (6.8) 95.4 (5.8) 90.4 (9.2) 5.0 (9.7) 1261 (257) 1403 (321) 1426 (271) 23 (233)
OLDEST CHILDREN
Small:Small 19 10;0 (0;3) 10 98.2 (4.5) 98.4 (4.6) 95.7 (7.6) 2.7 (4.9) 932 (162) 1140 (243) 1208 (223) 69 (164)
Small:Large 20 10;0 (0;3) 10 99.2 (3.7) 95.6 (5.0) 93.2 (6.7) 2.4 (4.5) 934 (171) 1184 (253) 1252 (243) 68 (145)
Large:Small 20 10;0 (0;4) 11 99.2 (2.6) 95.9 (5.1) 92.4 (6.1) 3.6 (6.5) 1076 (280) 1186 (401) 1293 (314) 107 (239)
Large:Large 21 10;0 (0;3) 11 97.6 (4.7) 97.6 (3.1) 94.1 (6.7) 3.5 (6.3) 1006 (139) 1213 (243) 1228 (207) 15 (196)
For ease of reference, switch costs are also shown. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
significant difference between the accuracy of the middle and old-
est children. Analysis of trial type revealed a significant switch
cost, F(1, 231) = 75.23, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24, with less accurate
performance on switch trials than non-switch trials. There was an
interaction between age group and trial type, F(2, 231) = 3.41, p <
0.05, η2 = 0.03. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests showed that
the youngest children had greater switch costs for accuracy than
the oldest children (p < 0.05). No other age comparisons were
significant. There was also a three-way interaction between age,
trial type and set size in the rule-learning phase, F(2, 231) = 3.15,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.03. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests showed
that for the youngest age group, switch costs were greater when
the set size in the rule-learning phase was large than when it was
small (p < 0.05). Set size in the rule-learning phase did not affect
switch costs for the middle or oldest age groups (ps> 0.1). There
was no effect of set size on the accuracy of performance. This indi-
cates that there were no baseline differences in overall accuracy on
the tasks between the set size conditions.
The analysis of RT data revealed amain effect of age, F(2, 231) =
53.78, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.32. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests
revealed that the youngest group was slower than both the mid-
dle and oldest age groups (ps < 0.01). The middle age group
was also slower than the oldest age group (p < 0.01). Analysis of
trial type revealed a significant switch cost, F(1, 231) = 33.84, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.13, with slower performance on switch trials than
non-switch trials (see Table 2 for the mean transformed RTs).
Two further significant interactions were revealed in the RT
analysis. First, the set size in the task-switching phase inter-
acted with the trial type F(1, 231) = 7.03, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03.
Overall, switch costs were larger when the set size in the
task-switching phase was small (M = 100ms) than when the set
size in the task-switching phase was large (M = 39ms). Separate
Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests were performed for RTs on
Switch and Non-switch trials comparing conditions with a small
set size in the task-switching phase and those with a large set size
in the task-switching phase. Descriptively, when there was a small
set size in the task-switching phase, non-switch trials were faster
than when there was a large set size in the task-switching phase.
Conversely, when there was a small set size in the task-switching
phase, switch trials were slower than when there was a large set
size in the task-switching phase (see Figure 3). However, these
differences were not significant (ps> 0.1).
Second, there was a three-way interaction between the set
size in the rule-learning phase, the set size in the task-switching
phase and the trial type, F(1, 231) = 7.73, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03.
Two pairwise Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests were conducted.
One compared switching costs between the two conditions with
a large set size in the rule-learning phase (the large:small and
large:large conditions). The other compared the two conditions
with a small set size in the rule-learning phase (the small:small
and small:large conditions). When the set size in the rule-learning
phase was large, switch costs were affected by the set size in the
task-switching phase (p < 0.05): switch costs were larger in the
large:small condition (M = 122ms) than in the large:large con-
dition (M = −9ms; this value is negative because switch trials
were faster than non-switch trials in this condition). When the set
size in the rule-learning phase was small, switch costs were not
affected by the set size in the task-switching phase (p > 0.1, see
Figure 3). There was no overall effect of set size on RT, which
indicates that the groups did not differ in terms of processing
speed.
Paired samples t-tests were conducted for each set size condi-
tion to determine whether RTs on switch and non-switch trials
were significantly different (i.e., whether there was a significant
switch cost). For the small:small, small:large and large:small con-
ditions, switch trials were slower than non-switch trials, ts >
1, ps < 0.01. For the large:large condition, RTs on switch and
non-switch trials did not differ significantly.
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 101 | 8
FitzGibbon et al. Primed to be inflexible
FIGURE 3 | Mean RT in the switch and non-switch trials as a function
of the set size in the rule-learning and task-switching phases. Error
bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
To test whether the set-size effect found in Experiment 1
was replicated in Experiment 2, planned comparisons of switch
costs in the small:small and large:large conditions were con-
ducted. These showed that there were greater switch costs in the
small:small condition than in the large:large condition, t(109) =
2.30, p < 0.05. Thus, the set-size effect reported in Experiment 1
was also replicated in Experiment 2.
Finally, to investigate whether there were more gradual age-
related changes in cognitive flexibility in our sample, accuracy
and RT switch costs (difference scores between switch and non-
switch trials) were entered into a bivariate correlation analysis
with age. Accuracy switch costs were negatively correlated with
age (mean-centered), r(241) = −0.16, p = 0.011. However, reac-
tion time switch costs were not related to age: r(241) = −0.056,
p = 0.38.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 replicated the key finding of Experiment 1, namely
that with school-aged children, a small set size leads to larger
switch costs than a large set size. In addition, Experiment 2
extended our understanding of how this effect comes about by
testing the two accounts of this effect: the Rule Representation
account and the Stimulus-Task Priming account. There was no
support for the Rule Representation account: a large set size in the
rule-learning phase did not lead to reduced switch costs compared
to a small set size. Conversely, there was support for the Stimulus-
Task Priming account: a large set size in the task-switching phase
led to reduced switch costs compared to a small set size in the task-
switching phase. However, the presence of a three-way interaction
between trial type, set size in the rule-learning phase and the set
size in the task-switching phase suggests that there is a more com-
plex story to be told. Further discussion of these accounts in light
of the current findings can be found in the general discussion.
Contrary to previous research, Experiment 2 did not pro-
vide evidence for age-related changes in stimulus-task priming.
Previous research has shown that 9- and 10-year-old children
are more susceptible to stimulus-task priming than young adults
(Hommel et al., 2011). Experiment 2 included children up to 10
years of age. The lack of interaction between age, trial type and the
set size in the task-switching phase suggests that developmental
changes in the ability to overcome stimulus task priming may be
limited to later childhood and adolescence. An alternative expla-
nation is that stimulus-task priming may be developmentally
invariant. This view is consistent with research demonstrating
that implicit learning processes such as priming of stimulus-
response associations does not change from infancy to adulthood
(Amso and Davidow, 2012).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments presented in this paper shed important new
light on how set size influences cognitive flexibility during devel-
opment. They extend previous research by showing that children’s
switch costs can be reduced by increasing the set size. This finding
is directly relevant to preschool research into cognitive flexibility.
The most widely used paradigm, the DCCS (Zelazo et al., 1996;
Müller et al., 2006), typically uses a small set size (usually com-
prising four stimuli in total). Experiment 1 and 2 indicate that
using a small set size is likely to be particularly difficult for chil-
dren, and that studies using such paradigms may systematically
underestimate children’s cognitive flexibility.
The present findings build on the work of Kray et al. (2012)
who showed that when children switched between tasks, they
experienced less interference when there was a large set size than
when there was a small set size. The two experiments presented
in this paper extend those findings to show that during the early
school years, switch costs can also be reduced when the set size
is increased. By manipulating set size in a paradigm that has
minimal incidental demands and which uses simple perceptual
categorization tasks, these experiments showed a robust effect of
set size on switch costs for children from 4 to 12 years.
The Rule Representation account of the set size effect was not
supported. According to this account, the set size affects the way
task rules are represented which affects switch costs. A small set
size during the rule-learning phase was expected to result in less
flexible stimulus-specific rule representations while a large set size
during the rule-learning phase was expected to result in more
flexible dimension-level rule representation. None of the predic-
tions derived from the Rule Representation account were borne
out in the findings of Experiment 2. Indeed, directly contrary to
the prediction of the Rule Representation account, the youngest
children’s accuracy switch costs were greater when there was a
large set size in the rule-learning phase than when there was a
small set size in the rule-learning phase. These findings suggest
that the way that task rules are represented does not drive the
facilitative effects of a large set size on switch costs.
Furthermore, the lack of effect of set size in the rule-learning
phase on switch costs raises questions over the robustness of
the association between abstraction and flexibility. Previous
research has shown that children who form dimension-level rep-
resentations of task rules have better cognitive flexibility than
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children with stimulus-specific rule representations (Kharitonova
et al., 2009; Kharitonova and Munakata, 2011). However, in
Experiment 2, there was no main effect of set size in the rule-
learning phase. Engendering dimension-level rule representation
by presenting participants with a large set size in the rule-learning
phase did not increase later flexibility during the task-switching
phase. It is possible that the rule-learning phase was too short to
engender stable rule representations that persisted into the task-
switching phase. However, research with children as young as
3 years demonstrates that dimension level and stimulus-specific
rule representations can be formed after six trials (Kharitonova
et al., 2009). In the two experiments presented in this paper, even
the youngest children made very few mistakes during the rule-
learning phase. This suggests that the rules were intuitive and
easy to learn. It remains a question for future research whether
more trials during the rule-learning phase would lead to more
persistent representations of task rules.
The Stimulus-Task Priming account is supported by the find-
ings of the two experiments presented in this paper. According
to this account, the set size in the task-switching phase affects
the amount of stimulus-task priming that occurs which affects
switch costs. More stimulus repetition occurs when the set size
was small in the task-switching phase than when the set size was
large in the task-switching phase. This was expected to result in
more stimulus-task priming and so greater switch costs when
the set size was small in the task-switching phase than when
the set size was large in the task-switching phase. First, in both
experiments, when the set size in the task-switching phase was
small, non-switch trials were faster and switch trials were slower
than when the set size in the task-switching phase was large
(although these differences were not statistically significant). This
was consistent with predictions from the Stimulus-Task Priming
account, since stimulus-task priming should be facilitative for
non-switch trials and detrimental for switch trials (Waszak and
Hommel, 2007). Second, in Experiment 2 there was a main effect
of set size in the task-switching phase. This provides evidence
that the link between set size and cognitive flexibility is medi-
ated by stimulus-task priming that occurs as a result of stimulus
repetition during the task-switching phase. This bottom-up pro-
cess includes priming as a result of stimulus repetition both
within task (which facilitates task repetition) and between the two
tasks (which impairs task switching). The findings of this study
suggest that young children’s cognitive flexibility is affected by
stimulus-task priming and that this priming contributes to switch
costs.
However, two findings from Experiment 2 suggest that switch
costs cannot be solely driven by bottom-up processes. First, switch
costs were found in the near-absence of stimulus-task prim-
ing, which suggests that top-down processes may also contribute
to switch costs. Specifically, in Experiment 2, significant switch
costs were found in the small:large condition. Recall that in this
condition, very little stimulus repetition occurs during the task-
switching phase. The switch costs that occur here are thus unlikely
to be driven by stimulus-task priming. Second, there was a three-
way interaction between trial type, set size in the rule-learning
phase and set size in the task-switching phase. This shows that
set size during the rule-learning phase has carryover effects that
moderate the effects of set size in the task-switching phase on
switch costs.
Both of the above findings can be explained by the same top-
down mechanism. We suggest that exposure to a small set size in
the rule-learning phase led children to expect high levels of con-
flict between the tasks in the task-switching phase. This would
have promoted more engagement of top-down control processes.
It is plausible that children will prepare more for task switches
under conditions where they expect high levels of conflict. Thus,
switch costs likely occur in the small:large condition as a result of
greater engagement from top-down control processes on switch
trials than non-switch trials. These same top-down control pro-
cesses likely attenuate the effects of set size in the task switching
phase. This explains the three-way interaction found in the RT
analysis. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Kray
et al. (2012), who found that children adapted better to conflict
with a small set size than a large set size.
Together, these findings suggest that a combination of top-
down and bottom-up processes contribute to switching costs
in early school age children, and that these are differentially
affected by manipulations of set size. This proposal is entirely
consistent with findings from the adult literature which sug-
gest that stimulus-task priming only partially accounts for the
cost of switching from one task to another (for a review, see
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). However, the developmental trajec-
tory of this interaction is still uncertain. Although we expected to
find a shift from bottom-up to top-down processing with devel-
opment (Munakata et al., 2012), our findings did not wholly
bear this out. We found little evidence for reliable developmen-
tal change in cognitive flexibility. It is true that accuracy switch
costs were negatively correlated with age in both experiments.
However, RT switch costs were negatively correlated with age
in Experiment 1, but not related to age in Experiment 2. This
inconsistency may in part have been due to the variability of per-
formance in our youngest age group (see standard deviations in
Tables 1, 2). It is common for response times to be variable for
children of this age (for example see Chevalier and Blaye, 2009).
This variability may be exacerbated by heterogeneity in cognitive
strategies employed by 5- and 6-year-olds when engaged in task
switching (Dauvier et al., 2012).
Clearly, set size influences different facets of cognitive flexi-
bility in conflicting ways. Having a smaller set size in the task-
switching phase impaired cognitive flexibility (leading to larger
RT switch costs) by increasing the amount of stimulus-task prim-
ing that subjects were subjected to. Conversely, having a smaller
set size in the rule-learning phase directly enhanced cognitive
flexibility for the youngest children (leading to smaller accu-
racy switch costs), and attenuated the effects of stimulus-task
priming on response time switch costs by increasing engage-
ment of top-down control processes. This highlights the com-
plexity of cognitive flexibility, demonstrating that a multitude
of processes must work in harmony to produce flexible behav-
ior (Cragg and Nation, 2010; Ionescu, 2012). However, it also
raises the interesting possibility that there are multiple routes
by which cognitive flexibility can be influenced, and that set
size may act in contrasting ways depending on the stage in the
task.
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Such an observation is particularly relevant for those involved
in educational research. There are many situations when cogni-
tive flexibility is necessary for academic performance (Bull and
Scerif, 2001; Blair and Razza, 2007; Bull et al., 2008). The current
paper suggests two distinct ways to promote cognitive flexibility
that can be applied to educational settings. First, by reducing the
amount of stimulus repetition, it is possible to reduce the amount
of interference between tasks (Kray et al., 2012) and to reduce the
costs of switching from one task to another. For example, it may
be possible to improve children’s ability to switch from addition to
subtraction problems when teaching arithmetic by ensuring that a
large set of numbers are used for the two sets of problems. Second,
it may also be possible use a small set size to promote children’s
top-down control by highlighting the conflict between tasks. Our
findings suggest that for school-age children this is most effec-
tive if done during situations with relatively low control demands,
such as during the rule-learning phase in our paradigm. This will
enable children to overcome some of the effects of stimulus-task
priming when interference between tasks is high.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A number of questions remain regarding the relationship between
set size and stimulus-task priming. First, stimulus-task priming
may occur at the perceptual or conceptual level (Waszak et al.,
2004). The manipulation of set size in the experiments pre-
sented here changed both the perceptual and conceptual set size
concurrently, so the relative roles of conceptual and perceptual
priming cannot be distinguished. Future research may address
this question by using tasks with a large perceptual set but a small
conceptual set (for example, many different shades of red and blue
stimuli).
Second, while it is now clear that bottom-up priming plays
a central role in the set size effect, it remains to be determined
what kind of priming is at work. There are at least two types
of bottom-up priming that may be occurring. Stimulus repeti-
tion across tasks may cause the competing task to be positively
primed (termed “competitor priming”) and the relevant task to
be negatively primed (termed “negative priming” Hübner et al.,
2003; Waszak et al., 2005). It is not yet known whether set size
influences competitor priming or negative priming or both, nor
whether these influences change with development.
Third, it is not known how stable the bindings between
stimuli and tasks are. Stimulus-task priming may be subject
to decay, so only driven by stimulus repetition from one trial
to the next or within a short time-frame (Allport and Wylie,
2000). Alternatively, bindings may be stable and long-lived,
so stimulus-task priming may be driven by stimulus repeti-
tion across the tasks, irrespective of intervening trials (Waszak
et al., 2003). While research has begun to address many of these
questions in adulthood, the nature of bottom-up influences on
children’s cognitive flexibility is still poorly understood. Due to
the limited number of trials entered into the analysis, it was
not possible to explore the stability of the stimulus-task bind-
ings in the experiments presented in this paper. Future research
should systematically manipulate the delay between pairings of
stimuli and tasks to determine the longevity of stimulus-task
priming effects.
The relationship between set size and top-down control pro-
cesses is also likely to be a fruitful pathway for further research.
The primary method for studying top-down control processes
during task switching is through manipulation of the time
allowed to prepare for each trial between the onset of the task
cue and the task stimuli (Meiran, 1996; Cepeda et al., 2001).
In the experiments reported in this paper, the task cue and the
prompt stimulus were presented simultaneously, so participants
were not able to prepare in advance for the task. This means
that task preparation that occurred following the onset of the cue
was likely to impact on response times. By manipulating both
preparation time and set size, future research will be able to deter-
mine unequivocally whether having a smaller set size during the
rule-learning phase increased children’s engagement of top-down
control processes.
CONCLUSION
The two experiments presented in this paper demonstrate that set
size influences cognitive flexibility during childhood. When tasks
have a large set size, the costs of switching are smaller than when
tasks have a small set size. This is of practical importance because
it suggests that children’s cognitive flexibility may have been
underestimated relative to adults’, since paradigms used with chil-
dren typically have a smaller set size than those used with adults.
Furthermore, Experiment 2 furthered theoretical understanding
of cognitive flexibility during development by elucidating the cog-
nitive mechanisms that drive this effect. First, it was shown that
differences in the amount of stimulus-task priming that occurs
drive the set size effect found in Experiment 1. Second, it was
shown that set size also influences children’s engagement in top-
down control processes. This engagement had a direct effect on
the youngest children’s cognitive flexibility, and attenuated the
effects of stimulus-task priming in across the sample. Further
exploration of both bottom-up and top-down effects of set size
on cognitive flexibility will continue to elucidate the factors that
contribute to the costs of task switching in children.
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